Introduction
As T.S. Eliot pithily told us in his famous poem, The Naming of Cats, naming is a difficult matter, absolutely not a holiday game. In leisure studies, as in sociology and the other social sciences, naming is a language game of primary importance. It not only conjures a term (or a combination of terms) by which an activity, category of experience, group of people, phenomenon, trend, or any other subject or object of thought associated with leisure (past and present) is known, but it also signifies a method of description, of conceptualisation, of classification, and, obviously, of labelling.
In this critical commentary, I am interested in the naming of the phenomenon of 'dark leisure', not just as an academic subject matter in leisure studies, but as a particular impulse of twenty first century freedom. As this special issue attests, of all recent developments in leisure studies, perhaps no event has registered a more widespread impact than the growth of interest in this phenomenon. There are articles and book chapters aplenty about its many manifestations but none of these attempt to spell out in any precise detail what it amounts to. This article should be read as an attempt to spell out what this something might be. As far as I know, it is the first attempt to do so. I have searched the literature for something of its kind and found nothing, except a number of general representations that have emerged from research on dark leisure which suggest that this phenomenon constitutes a body of theory and concepts that rest on four core assumptions (see for example Spracklen and Spracklen (2012) and Stone and Sharpley (2014) ). First, it arises in connection with leisure that is perceived as 'deviant' or 'abnormal'. Second, it tends takes place in 'new communicative (dark) spaces' and/or liminal settings of social ambiguity which reach out towards alternative communitastype realities. Third, it is appealing to those individuals and groups fascinated with death and/or are bound together through their interest in dark (often gothic) popular culture, whether focused on fashion, decoration, travel, film, music etc. And fourth, certain moral implications often arise as a result of dark leisure activities. Given these varied understandings, it is important to explore the theories and concepts used in more detail.
I am not talking about offering anything so bold as a definitive interpretation, but something more modest: a guide to what it is about dark leisure that makes it attractive to certain academics and ordinary people alike. I shall argue that a number of themes can be identified as recurring elements surrounding the phenomenon of dark leisure. The similarities that the reader will find here are in the pattern of what Wittgenstein gave the name family resemblance: what makes the members of a family look alike is not that there are some characteristics which appear in all of them, but rather that each member resembles some of the others in one way or another, and that not one of them looks wholly different from the rest. When I say in the following discussion that dark leisure is 'abnormal leisure' (Rojek 2000) , 'heterotopic' (Foucault 1984) , and so on, I do not point at some common essence that all of them share, but at their family resemblance.
To keep up the family metaphor, what I am proposing is that dark leisure must be interpreted pragmatically rather than definitively. With respect to this idea, reference must also be made to Wittgenstein's other key idea of language games. Wittgenstein knew that metaphors are important for clarifying understanding, not only because they use language in magical and enlivening ways, but also because they are edifying and enlightening. To this end the idea of language games is concerned with the way in which words can only be properly understood in the context of their use. This last observation notwithstanding it is nonetheless challenging to address critically a 'family' whose members are so different in kind, and so numerous, that it would be difficult to get to know them all personally in such a short commentary as this one. To approach this task, then, I will only offer a brief critical discussion of some of the members of the immediate family. Before I do this, however, we need to discuss some fundamental issues that arise when trying to think critically about the word 'darkness'.
Darkness
It would be impossible, in the space of a short essay, to do anything like justice to this word.
But it is worth drawing up a brief inventory of the family characteristics that make it distinctive. 'Darkness' is known to all cultures; and there has been and survives a semantically equivalent word in every culture, referring to an absence of 'light'. But for time Here 'darkness' is the absence of 'light' in the same way that 'evil' is the absence of 'good'. These seductively reassuring propositions of dualism suggest that the structure of reality is binary and our knowledge of the world is essentially always a double. As Derrida (1992) , the great French philosopher, famously pointed out, within this system of thought one part of that binary is always more important than the other, that one term is 'marked' as positive and the other negative. Derrida argues that all binary pairs work this way; one term is always valued over the other, given special presence, which is always favoured over absence.
What this tells us is that word 'darkness' says that the condition of the thing to which it applies is not what it ought to be, or what it is normally expected to be. It is sinister or evil, gloomy or dismal, ignorant or unenlightened, and as such denotative of some kind of deformity, malfunction or aberration. In other words, in most if not all cultures, 'darkness' means abnormality of the normal state of human affairs. To this extent 'abnormality' signifies those kinds of leisure activities and interests which are condemned by the 'value consensus' as 'wrong', while implying that they also need to be censured or socially controlled.
Abnormal leisure
Among the first degree relatives of the dark leisure family, it would make sense then to identify first abnormal leisure (Rojek 2000) . This idea might be understood as the designation for all that is strange and deviant, unbridled and tempestuous, and which in many cases are likely to be infractions of the criminal law. It also constitutes the outlandish leisure pursuits that we are illicitly attracted to, but also fear and dare not try to fathom, but are often nonetheless fascinated enough to try out. To this extent, abnormal leisure is the example par excellence of the unresolved, disturbing forms of our desires and fantasies, which are explored to good effect by Ken Kalfus (2006) Borrowing a concept or two from Freud and contextualizing his core argument around the concepts of liminality, edgework and surplus energy, Rojek (2000) outlines three key types of abnormal leisure: wild, invasive, mephitic leisure. Rojek's first category involves limitexperiences through edgework and as such tends to be opportunistic in character. It involves the individual's self-absorbed desire for instant gratification. The experience of 'limit' is the name of the game with wild leisure which includes deviant crowd behaviour such as rioting, looting and violence, particularly at sports events. Rojek also suggests that new technology presents individuals intent on pursuing wild leisure with ever more opportunities for instant gratification, typically in the form of video clips of anything from violence in sport to genocide, which present individuals with the vicarious 'delight of being deviant' (Katz 1988) .
To borrow an insight from Susan Sontag (1965, 215) , such abnormal leisure activities often offer the satisfaction 'of extreme moral simplification -that is to say, a morally acceptable fantasy where one can give outlet to cruel, or at least amoral feelings.'
Invasive leisure focuses on abnormal behaviour associated with self-loathing and self-pity and the ways in which disaffected individuals experience anomie and personal alienation from the rest of society, losing themselves in drink, drug or solvent abuse in order that they can 'turn their back on reality'.
As with wild leisure, mephitic leisure encompasses a wide range of pursuits and activities, from mundane encounters with prostitutes to the buzz of murdering through serial killing.
Why Rojek calls these leisure pursuits mephitic is that they are generally understood to be 'noxious', 'nasty', 'foul' and 'morally abhorrent' by most 'normal' people, because they cause major offence to the moral order of things. To this extent mephitic leisure experiences involve the individual's self-absorbed desire for gratification at the expense of the self and others. What Rojek is alluding to here is that the death drive is just as important to understanding leisure as the pleasure principle (Freud 1995a) . In other words, we often act in complete disregard of our self-interest and the interest of others in order to act out compulsions that we do not understand. Moreover, there are occasions when we will sacrifice anything and everything (even life itself) for our particular enjoyment. At the core of Rojek's thesis is a rather unsettling message about the persistence of violence in leisure. A good example here might be blood sports which sees some people hunting animals because they enjoy killing them. What this suggests is that, for some people, the 'hot' blood of the hunt is some kind of compensation for the 'cold' bloodiness of modern life.
What this tells us is that we might look back at what previous generations did with horror, but the glorification of violence and its enjoyment is still very much a part of modern leisure. Freud (1995b, 775) suggested as much in the first section of his famous essay Civilisation and Its Discontents, when he took Rome to be a useful metaphor for the processes of modern civilisation. Like Rome, Freud suggested, modernity might be evolving towards a newer and better society but it could not entirely shake off its past. Modernity carries with it, beneath its modern foundations, the ambivalence of its own historicity. As Freud put it, 'nothing which has once been formed can perish -that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back far enough) it can once more be brought to light'. What Freud's analysis suggests is that at one level there is with the emergence of modernity progressive affirmation of civilisation; but at another it has 'buried in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings' the regressive means of decivilisation.
Leisure values
A second matter, then, I would identify in relation to dark leisure is the concern with values, especially moral and ethical values. There is an 'ethical' divide about the relative merits of abnormal leisure in leisure studies. Criticizing Rojek's work, Aitchison has argued that 'violence, abuse and violations of human rights may well play a part in exploitative leisure relations but these acts themselves are not acts of leisure -they are acts of violence and should be named and researched as such ' (quoted in Rojek 2000, 167) . However, throughout his publishing career, Rojek has refuted all the axioms of leisure as it is normally understood in leisure studies. This 'ideal' kind of leisure may be claimed as the norm in leisure studies, with alternatives drawn from the 'dark side' rejected as immoral and therefore, strictly speaking not leisure, because of their dereliction of leisure's proper role which is to edify, bring individuals together in communities, and so on. However, what this 'ideal' ignores is the necessity to take seriously the totality as part of the story of modern leisure and not just the bits we happen to think are good and proper. In Rojek's view abnormal leisure may belong to the forbidden and the deadly, but is simply not true that we need be wholly opposed abnormal leisure experiences, even when we feel they are morally suspect. We need to engage with them if we are to understand their meaning for those involved. Hannah Arendt (1963) coined the expression 'banality of evil' in order to bring to our attention the shocking ordinariness of such activities. In the light of Arendt's perceptive observation we should recognise that Rojek is merely tearing off leisure studies' veil of respectability to reveal what lurks in the hearts and minds of a good many men and women, which enables him to say something important about the infinite playfulness of the human mind. The mirror image this holds up to us may not be an ideal picture -it can frequently be dreadful and upsetting, and often even morally repugnant -but it is leisure all the same.
For all the strengths of Rojek's analysis, however, he does not give sufficient consideration to two important issues. First, he fails to recognise the fact that in its contemporary usage abnormal leisure is often complicated by its tendency to come in commodity form. Second, and related to this first issue, while foregrounding the way the death drive takes precedence over the power of the pleasure principle, leading some individuals to seek suffering rather than pleasure, he never discusses the wider implications of this for understanding abnormal leisure. It is to these two issues that we must now turn.
Leisure, deviance and consumptive deviance
Drawing on the topic of sport and using the term deviant leisure, rather than abnormal leisure, Blackshaw and Crabbe (2004) argue that since the 1990s the demarcation between 'real' deviance and that which has been produced for consumption has blurred as the abnormal has been turned into yet another marketable commodity. In other words, so called 'deviant' behaviour in sport is, as they put it, 'often just surface, flow and performance without the exit wounds'. This is abnormal leisure staged for consumption and the sense of the spectacular that is often involved, but also the mass and the calibre of the audience for it, since it is through marketized images, 'confessionals' and rumours of celebrity 'deviance' in sport that our desires for the 'deviant' Other tend more and more to be fulfilled. In a culture in which consumption is paramount, consuming 'deviant' sport becomes yet another lifestyle choice. The consumption of 'deviance', or what Blackshaw and Crabbe call 'consumptive deviance', seeks to capture a sense of the phantasmagoric nature of existence which eludes In other words, consumer capitalism now 'needs' irrationality and impulsive behaviour, and as such, the concept of abnormal leisure simply reflects the dynamics of our contemporary lived condition -it is, paradoxically, the norm. Drawing on the work of Bauman (2000), they argue that today the societal conventions associated with Freud's (1995a) concept of the reality principle which involved forsaking the irrational and postponing pleasure through the constant suppression of the desire for the transgressive and the 'deviant', might be considered to have been replaced by a 'precarized' hybrid existence which is both more intense but at the same time much less sure, lacking a distinctive singular feel. Since whilst the label of abnormal was easily applied in the producer based capitalism -with its requirement for selfdiscipline through the values of Protestant work ethic -in our era of 'liquid' modern consumer capitalism the ideal consumer is not a coherent and self-disciplined individual with a fixed identity, but somebody who can identify with an endless supply of commodity goods.
Somebody who is also always open to new desires and new fantasies including the seductive allure of abnormal leisure which nourishes the desiring and fantasizing impulses which are both acknowledged and necessary to sustain the mediated capitalist consumer-based economy. Consumerism prospers because it is best placed to furnish human life with the necessary distractions to divert our attention from the oppressive awareness of our mortality.
In so doing it homogenizes the abnormal by melting together consumption and deviance.
This does not mean that all the categories of consumptive deviance are at bottom all the same. On the contrary. They could not serve their adherents as guides to living if they did not embody within them the distinctive qualities which differentiate them from other kinds of leisure. The point is that now that deviant behaviour has no need for indirection, now that its sense of aberrancy has been eased because the pleasure principle no longer remains in the shadow of the reality principle (Blackshaw and Crabbe 2004, 85) and its place in society adumbrated if not secured, it has become ripe for consumption.
What this suggests is that today dark leisure might also be considered as something that provides consumers with a passport, which allows them to relatively safely transgress the boundaries of the permissible, allowing unmitigated access to what is conventionally repressed or forbidden. Rojek (2000, 191) argues that this kind of leisure turns us into shockconnoisseurs, seeking the next thrill, as we 'play at being deviant and engage in what Katz (1988) describes as 'the delight of being deviant''. It is the vicarious sense of having done something bad that feels rather cool that matters. In other words, the dangerous enjoyment people get from dark leisure doesn't just capture the euphoria of 'deviancy', it also provides the romance of it. Sloterdijk (2012, 52) argues that nothing is more normal today than removing ourselves from any kind of normality. This kind of life practice is perhaps best encountered in 'the shadow worlds of reverie' Foucault called heterotopias.
Heterotopic leisure
In contrast to the homogenizing tendencies of consumptive deviance in which dark leisure emerges as a kind of entertainment, those who seek dark leisure in heterotopia are after heterogeneity and spiritual experience. There is an abstraction from time and space which corresponds to a Bergsonian time of subjective experience that replaces objective time experience. Here the existence is the mystery -the secret, the unknown known -not the meaning and purposes of leisure, that is of true significance.
As I argue in Blackshaw (2017) , too complex for rational interpretation, yet at the same time seemingly a tabula rasa for all individuals' desires, heterotopias are 'disturbing', probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 'hold together'. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias …desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences (Foucault, 1970, xix) .
In an article Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias, first published in 1967, Foucault (1984) identifies two main categories of heterotopia. There are the pre-modern heterotopias of crisis, otherwise known as 'elsewhere' places which tended to be relegated to the margins of modern societies. Foucault has in mind here privileged places such as single-sex boarding schools where young boys are taken through a sexual rite of passage that is neither homosexual nor heterosexual; sacred places such as pilgrimage sites; and forbidden places In developing a more elaborate conception of this second category of heterotopia, Foucault's analysis suggests that these 'elsewhere' places must be understood in relation to the kind of society in which they occur. Where conventional leisure worlds fit snuggly into reality; leisure heterotopias do not. In any society there are some people for whom the 'real world' does not resonate with their own experiences. Even though we are indoctrinated into thinking that 'this way, rather that that' is the right way to live, we tacitly know it is mistaken. In other words, the 'real world' robs some people of the kind of fullness of life others are able to find in normalcy. The 'real world' is for these individuals at once too much and not enough. What Foucault's analysis suggests is that a sense of recompense for a life that is not being lived in the confines of the 'real world' leads people down the track of heterotopia: reality and rationality are not on their menus, since what they are after is an unmediated immediacy of something together out of the ordinary.
To this extent heterotopias tend to come to life in pointillist time, which means they are experienced as episodic. They constitute sequestered spaces which have their very own systems of 'opening and closing' that both isolate them from the rest of society and operate to exclude those who do not have the necessary credentials to enter. In so doing heterotopias, function by way of opposition; that is they have a tendency to unfold 'between two extreme poles'. However, heterotopia offers spaces of compensation (rather than the illusion of utopia) and as such functions in relation to the way that its (deviant) populations understand they are imagined by the rest of society. In heterotopia individuals do not try to resist reality so much as escape it -and in so doing creatively find their own place in it.
Beneath the calm surface of everyday social reality flow strong and deadly currents. Against sad obscurity, against surrender to societal norms, against normalcy, heterotopia suggests desire for an alternative kind of knowledge, for another kind of determination, for ragtag unyielding life, the kind of worlds that provide expression and shelter for the ones who choose to escape meaning there. Heterotopias are a feast for anyone hungry for otherness.
Their incumbents create spectacular spaces in which 'reality' itself seems to dissolve under the pressures of desire and we are left with individuals who shape-shift personalities as their compulsions are let loose. Whoever seeks out a heterotopia knows that once they arrive there, they will find a special kind of freedom. For these individuals the world most of us call the 'real world' is not the real world: the real world is an-other world.
In heterotopia nothing is straightforward. Because hermeneutics is absent words have their own usages, and nothing is ever never quite settled. Make-believe is pervasive, often the custom. Leisure heterotopias belong to the 'communities' that create and use them. They represent alternative kinds of cognitive, social and moral space, emerging not from 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 institutions, enabling dark tourism places in the representation of taboo topics to become contemporary (dark) communicative spaces. Third, individuals collectively assemble in these new communicative (dark) spaces, resulting, potentially, in both the provision and extraction of moral meaning about a particular tragic event, which in turn allows the self to become embodied through a dark leisure experience. Finally, collective effervescence and its resultant emotional energy is discharged through and by embodied individuals within these new socially sanctioned dark spaces, whereby morality is conveyed not only by official interpretation of death or tragedy but also by the actual presence and emotional engagement of the individual visitor…This reconfiguration and revitalisation of moral issues through dark leisure is not deviant, nor should it generate discourse about deviance, but instead it should be viewed as a process of contemporary society in which we renegotiate moral boundaries and ethical principles through consuming the taboo. Therefore, it is, perhaps, the process of dark tourism which attracts individuals to consume death in new insulating spaces that generates a perceived deviance, in addition, or even rather than, the actual death, disaster or tragedy that dark tourism seeks to represent (2014, .
Through this model Stone and Sharpley's key concern is to analyse the prospects of securing social cohesion in the face of the rapid social changes brought about by individualisation. In resolving this 'problem', they conceive dark leisure in Durkheimian terms, which in their view not only reaffirms social integration through 'collective effervescence', but also provides a forum for helping to resolve moral issues through consuming what the 'value consensus' sees as taboo. Like Durkheim they also proffer that deviance is actually normal; it is an important aspect of public discourse, and as such an integral part of the functioning of a healthy society.
By contrast, I would argue that analytic attention should be squarely focused on the ways in which individualisation has radically transformed our relationship with death. In my view it is the loss of belief in immortality that lies at the root of religion's decline in western civilisation. It was the spectacular failure of religion to offer modern individuals an effective solution to the problem of death that led to its decline. And, as we lost our belief in religion's F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y ability to provide us with immortality we began to obsess about death. As we have seen, Freud assumed that the death drive controls human behaviour beyond the pleasure principle; it overrides the power of the pleasure principle and leads us to seek suffering rather than pleasure. But in heterotopia the death drive also acts as an entrance to another kind of world: immortality, understood in secular terms. Heterotopia not only facilitates our desire to escape from the social controls imposed on us by the 'real world' but offers us our own 'private roads to immortality' (Bauman 1992) . As I argue in Blackshaw (2017, 160-1) , these tend to come in two approved and practised life-strategies: this of felo de se aesthetic design (read: performativity) and that of immortalis interpretation (read: devotion). The former is a strategy geared towards revelation and the latter is a strategy geared towards conservation and restoration, of adapting new art forms from older ones. Some devotional leisure life-worlds may play one up and play the other down; but all devotional leisure lifeworlds deploy these two strategies. The former is positioned as an individual attribute and tends to surface spectacularly, but it is not fundamentally personal since all those who practise their devotion together have the potential to share in its achievement. The latter is positioned as a collective destiny, but it also serves as a vehicle fit for personal fulfilment.
Underlying such life-strategies is also a longing for some kind of spiritual home, where we (individuals de facto) can belong, where, on arrival, an aggregate of isolated individuals can become a community of sorts. The sense of 'community' heterotopia generates is defined by a radical alterity. As Deleuze and Guatarri (1987) would argue, the 'community' experienced here is 'traversal', very much a plural process of unification, moving beyond the constraints implied by the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible, between presence and absence. Transversal unity has an open-textured quality that emerges in democratic communication that enables shared ways of being-in-the-world that know no boundaries.
What Lyotard (1988) calls the differend offers another compelling way of explaining this present/absent 'community'. In a differend there lies something that is beyond mere description. The question then becomes how to do justice to the something that cannot help but be missing. Lyotard's answer is that first of all you have to bear witness to it. Secondly, you appeal to the kinds of feelings that enable you to supplement this evidence, the kinds of higher pleasure that take you to that extreme where the pleasure principle meets the death drive. As Lyotard points out, only feelings can bear witness to the differend, and in particular the feeling of the sublime. It is the sublime then that enables those involved to sense the presence of 'community' (the feeling of intense, trembling pleasure that is only found in communion with another human being ) and equally the sense the impossibility of 'community' ('fantasies of closeness, of intimacy, that are way in excess of human possibility' (Phillips 2006, 31) ). This is the double pulse of this 'community', between the present and the absent, between the ideal and the real, between life and death, between the world that opens up in the imagination and world of everyday social relations. What Durkheim once said of religion is true of heterotopian 'community': it is conceived of nothing more (and nothing less either) than strangely organized practices that pay due reverence to the actuality of 'being together', 'and thereby ensuring that this 'being together' can go on without causing too much trouble' (Raud, in Bauman and Raud 2015, 76) .
The central life strategy adopted here is one intent on rekindling the ultimate experience of 'community' which just like death itself cannot help but be missing in the 'real world'. But those who seek community in heterotopia live for the moment, for the successive 'now'. As I demonstrate in my discussion of the gay men who cruise for group sex in Delany's novel, the individuals involved strive to squeeze all reality into the present. The kinds of 'community' found in heterotopia are always affecting, but also always contingent, aleatory, ephemeral and indeterminate. In heterotopia, 'community' never goes further than its 'as-ifness'. Here community envisages eternity, not as permanent fixity, but as ephemeral ecstasy. It is the experience of departure that is the key to understanding heterotopian 'community'. The key point is that we do not really know the significance of what we experienced there -the intense pleasure, the intimate sense of camaraderie -was until we leave. It is the experience of departure that is the litmus test, as this tells us how big a part of ourselves we are leaving behind. Heterotopia is somewhere we are always leaving, and we spend much of our lives trying to regain its experience again. This is why the sense of belonging found in heterotopia is also best understood in terms of a certain kind of death. Heterotopia might not have any firm foundations on which to build something more enduring, but it is a different world, one that has room for someone 'just like you'. Despite the fact that it is always temporary, it is always welcoming to people who look and sound 'just like you' -people from elsewhere.
The 'community' created in heterotopia, if not fireproofing you from death itself, at least retards the flame of exclusion. In the 'real' world this is something that is never going to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 value on which all these various family members must converge is a name variously interpreted but one that never belongs to more than one cat.
And that is the name that you never will guess;
The name that no human research can discoverBut THE CAT HIMSELF KNOWS, and will never confess.
When you notice a cat in profound meditation, The reason, I tell you, is always the same:
His mind is engaged in a rapt contemplation Of the thought, of the thought, of the thought of his name:
His ineffable effable Effanineffable Deep and inscrutable singular Name.
The simplest way of reading these lines is, of course, to take Eliot's conclusion literally to mean that cats cannot speak for themselves. Or perhaps to presume that by finishing the poem in this way, he is implying that species-specific experience is all we humans have got and that we need more than our imaginations to get inside the Umwelten of cats, in order to understand how they think. Yet even if that is true (and there is other evidence in the poem we have read these concluding lines, we should have learned that notwithstanding the complexity of the names we conjure to explain how living creatures experience their worlds, the one specific value on which all of these must converge is freedom. Specifically, the freedom we have to identify and express ourselves in our own inimitable ways.
Eliot's admonition is to educate us to think in new ways about the nature of freedom by questioning what it is possible for us as scholars to finally 'know' about other subjects. This alerts us to the dangers of bringing 'objective' interpretations to 'subjective' realities and offers a word of warning that there is so much more to be done in terms of the 'subjectivation' side of things. In the transgressive inner worlds of dark leisure other things matter. The imagination is allowed to flourish. Here you alight on constant activity: desire, fetishist sex, necrophilia, escapology -infinite kinds of eccentricity. What this tells us is that 'subjectivation' gives meaning to what escapes 'objectivation'. This is the measure of its freedom. These are not worlds that are being arranged into a visible pattern, it is the life process going on regardless. Those who find freedom there are all of us: a multitude of individuals. We just happen to be leading our own (dark) leisure lives. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
